Growth Times

In the first two installments of this blog series, I looked into the massive salary of MaRS Discovery District’s CEO, the vast deficit in public reporting in spite of over $130M in public subsidies, the lack of performance management, the systemically poor results and low ROI, the lack of transparency of grant decisions and the reliance on intimidation and ostracization to silence critics.

Yesterday I published a companion post with extracts from the feedback  I received so far, the importance of whistleblowing in a healthy democracy, and the direct impact those who get more than their fair share (like the CEO of MaRS) should know they have on others, like entrepreneurs  who have to work another full-time job to make ends meet.

Now I will take a look into the claims by MaRS that it constitutes a “public-private partnership”, and its expansion into the realm of private services.

But first, the 2009 salaries of MaRS employees were just published as part of the latest provincial disclosure, so below is a screenshot. The CEO made $436K in 2009, and MaRS continues to use public funding to add positions compensated over $100K – there are now 16 (out of 42 employees in 2008 – staff numbers for 2009 have not been disclosed yet):

MaRS salaries above $100K in 2009

What public-private partnership?

On its website, MaRS claims that a “combination of private and public funding allows MaRS—a charitable organization—to offer these services.” While MaRS spins its communication to imply that private donors generously contribute to the budget, and thus that taxpayers’ dollars acted as a catalyst, the reality is very different. Almost all of the revenue (over 90% in 2008) comes from government grants and rental / meeting room income from buildings purchased with public dollars.

If you think much private capital went into MaRS, think again. In an interesting 2006 Powerpoint presentation by the hub, the numbers already showed that only $16M came from private sector donations – while government subsidies amounted to $79M. There were loans too, but those qualify as much as private “investments” as the money credit card companies lend us every month. Overall, a far cry from the catalyst effect we were sold on.

From a planned $79M, the subsidies actually reached $130M by 2008. But the private contributions did not increase – the sure sign of a good public-private partnership. I would also be curious to learn what the private donors got in return for their money. Private companies do not tend to give away money for nothing.

Tell me again, why do we need a taxpayer-funded incubator, when there is plenty of office and private incubator space in the city?

I met MaRS CEO Ilse Treurnicht once in 2007 as I was seeking support for TagOver, a web startup I was working on at the time (an app to replace folders with linkable tags – a technology Gmail recently introduced). I think she was looking to hire people for MaRS, and I was looking to get some help with my venture. The discussion, although courteous, ended quickly given that my little operation was of no interest to her.

See, Ilse was busy presenting MaRS as a public-private partnership to the public. Take a look at this 2008 video (or its transcript). In it, the CEO pulls all the stops to introduce MaRS as a trendy catalyst of private investment.  She talks about “the unique public-private partnership nature of MaRS’ (2:26 in the video), and then in even more epic ways at minute 5:40. The key argument supporting this partnership model was phase II of the MaRS center, which was to be built by a private U.S. developer.

While phase 2, unlike phase 1, might have been a partnership of sort, the developer pulled out of the project during the crisis (see David Crow’s write-up at the time).

But now that the crisis is apparently behind us, it is likely that there is appetite from MaRS to resume the plans, if they haven’t yet proceeded with that. I suspect that the government might be asked again to contribute. After all, the provincial authorities gave Waterloo-based Communitech $26.4m last year for the creation of a “Digital Media & Mobile Accelerator” (a $107-million project, with the rest coming primarily from other levels of government and “some private sponsors”). It looks like the bureaucrats think the main problem of start-ups is to find offices, and that private incubators don’t cut it – so why not take advantage of that flawed belief while it lasts?

Which leads to the real question here: why is a non-profit organization like MaRS in the business of hosting companies using taxpayer’s money, when there are plenty of private office buildings and incubators in the city? And when so many in the entrepreneurship community don’t think it is a good idea (I’d love to call for an independent professional survey here). The extravagant building of the hub goes against the very essence of entrepreneurship and all the advice about bootstrapping. Do you picture Steve Jobs starting Apple from those buildings?

MaRS charges high rates for booking meeting rooms and hosting companies, and one key reason clients go along with it is preferred access to public money and connections (remember the very reason the U.S. selected Washington D.C. as their capital city was to distance it from the business interests in N.Y. and Boston). The claims of creating a “global address” as MaRS puts it is highly debatable. Most people in Toronto don’t know what MaRS is, let alone people internationally. If we spend those millions for awareness, then it’s not clear that it worked – we could achieve better results with much less money. VCs and investors I know also tend not to look at delegations led by a public-sector institution as a sign of dynamism.

The bottom line: our taxes should not help create bureaucracies that replace a more efficient private sector.

It’s not just real estate

MaRS, a non-profit organization, and the other hubs in the region increasingly offer private-sector services like business planning,  sales and marketing, financing and funding strategy, human resources, financial management, product development and marketing, customer relationship management, strategic partnerships. Now, I may be biased, since many of those are services I offer through my private practice, but I think my experience both as a private provider who also saw MaRS “in action” (or inaction) – and has to be deliberately retained by clients based on performance -  is relevant.

Currently, consultants or contractors in strategy and marketing are seen as “generally not as effective in dealing with the needs of emerging companies as people with more specific background”, as I was told last year by the head of the Market Readiness Program, in spite of the projects I was referred and complimented for by MaRS advisors (and a specific background of dealing with the needs of emerging companies!)… Yet the publicly-funded institution has no problem partnering closely with lawyers and accountant, even co-organizing events with selected private practices like Deloitte and Ogilvy Renault, and welcoming several as tenants in the MaRS building, so it looks like a clear case of rejecting competitors to the hub – and to the private practices that multiple advisors support or run on the side.

But, if the private sector is that efficient, why can’t it simply out-market the non-profit institution? We often do, actually. But it’s hard to beat free. Free creates a culture of free – entrepreneurs who received free help from hubs are not only less prone to paying for commercialization services, but they also end up more suspicious of the added value, since the institution frequently falls far short of the expectations.

MaRS’s selective give-away advisory services disrupt the marketplace, harm a perfectly viable private sector and prevent the creation of a viable, sustainable ecosystem for start-ups and early-stage ventures. With the right tax policy and less red tape (congratulations to the Federal government for repelling section 116), I’d argue that the private sector is best equipped to provide commercialization support.

After all, the essence of commercialization is about making people pay for a solution to their need: if hubs can’t do that for themselves, they should not be in the business of teaching it to others.

We don’t need no start-up bureaucracy – give the money to start-ups instead

Start-up evangelist David Crow pointed out the expansion of those public hubs in this post. There is now a myriad of agencies each with their own “advisors” and “entrepreneurs-in-residence”, competing for power and funds, and increasingly venturing into activities that are perfectly viable for the private sector.  The expansion of those bureaucracies seems insatiable (MaRS alone added another 10 positions in 2008) and anyone in that space knows that there is a clear power struggle at play, along the attempted institutionalization of commercialization activities.

What’s clear is that MaRS so far has been little more than a public play. It operates an incubator using public money and competes with perfectly viable private interests. It does not have the private sector efficiencies and built-in performance management. It would fit right in Dubai but does not get us closer to a Silicon Valley.

We all agree that a public “oasis” acting like a forum and meeting space for entrepreneurs downtown is a good idea. But taxpayers in Toronto pay $50 each for this oasis, now taken over by a group that by all account is using these resources to further their own interests. As a Toronto venture capitalist recently told me: “this is a honey pot, and parasites are going to take advantage of it until the last drop.”

There are other hubs running mostly with volunteer professionals as advisors, and the help they provide is not subpar compared to MaRS with its highly-paid professional staff. Their ROI is likely much higher. With the rise of commercial hubs based on the Y-incubator model and the growing number of highly-experienced commercialization consultants with a clear incentive to perform, there is no need for public advisors, and with the money we save from their salaries we could help many startups. So give the money to start-up founders instead – and through tax breaks.

We could also make use of an organization with the clout to represent entrepreneurs’ interests in the political arena, but MaRS isn’t even well equipped for that, since it is paid for by the government. That’s something professional associations are best equipped to do, as NACO and CVCA have recently shown.

Even if the hubs’ generic advice and select grants help some start-ups, overall it distorts the playing field and hurts our attempt to create a self-standing, sustainable innovation economy based on sound market principles. Overall, the MaRS model costs too much and does not work.

In my final post, I will make suggestions on how to improve public support to entrepreneurs in Ontario.

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• Background Note on Whistleblowing (in Context of the Series on MaRS Discovery District) (growthtimes.com)
• Troubling Facts about MaRS Discovery District (Part 1 of 4) (growthtimes.com)

Canadian entrepreneurs commercialization, entrepreneurship, incubators, mars discovery district, marsdd, Ontario, performance management, public accountability, public policy, public-private partnerships, toronto

Since I started this series, I have received multiple emails of support from entrepreneurs – several of whom are “clients” of MaRS – and innovation practitioners. Here are some extracts:

I appreciate your courage to post your views (which I share) on the MaRS topic”  (from a university research commercialization specialist and entrepreneur)

“Being a client of MaRS, I share your sentiments, but wouldn’t do so in public (for the same reasons you mention)” (from a Toronto entrepreneur)

“I forwarded your site to some of my friends at MaRS. I’m finding it quite revealing to say the least!” (from a MaRS tenant)

“I saw your post on MaRS. I had heard the numbers, but had not had the link to them. Thank you.” (from an angel group member)

“MaRS is like the planet. It’s cold and distant. Apart from some educational sessions, it doesn’t do much for actual start-ups, yet it wants to control our galaxy. They should call it the Death Star.” (a Toronto entrepreneur)

“Can’t disagree with anything you are saying” (a long-time MaRS client)

“The story sounds interesting, and clearly quite relevant.” (from a national paper business columnist)

“They’re all so pompous and useless at MaRS, as if they’re running a NASA lab (…) If they had given that money to real entrepreneurs instead, they would have created more jobs and wealth” (from a Toronto entrepreneur)

“MaRS lacks any sort of accountability. Their impact is unknown because they don’t publish any relevant metric” (executive at another innovation hub)

In case you wonder, I received only one negative comment (see the update to my first post – showing that according to MaRS’s own statistics, each advisor works a total of 5 days per year to help entrepreneurs). In a way, it is disappointing. And no news from MaRS, which I imagine is making sure not to give this any publicity.

Note I am looking to inform relevant people in the political sphere about this issue, and I would welcome any suggestion as to whom might be appropriate. You can email me at gregboutin -AT- gmail.com.

On whistleblowing

A recurring theme in most of the emails of support communications is fear. There are many, many people agreeing that something is wrong with the MaRS approach, but most of them admit fearing the consequences on their reputation and revenue if they were to publicly express their thoughts.

There is something very wrong with our system if one can’t put forward valid concerns without feeling threatened. Being a whistleblower is rarely a career-enhancing move – but I’d argue that, when confronted to such a waste of dollars, raising concerns and asking questions is an ethical requirement. How can one go home and look at their kids in the eyes otherwise?

In the past few years I have done that a few times, so I am used to the label. Plus, I was born in France, which doesn’t help given the reputation. I guess I should have been a journalist, but I don’t write that well and I prefer to be actively involved in companies.

In 2003, while working shortly as an intern for a financial analysis firm in Richmond Hill, I discovered that Shell was misreporting their oil reserves. Told that to my boss, who chose to ignore it. Bad move: 6 months later, we had this.

Last year, I pointed out that the web app Twine lost 80-90% of its traffic after being flagged by Google. A number of us had mentioned the usability problems of the application, meeting a hostile response from the founder. After wasting $25M, Twine’s CEO was recently let go and the company’s resources “merged” with another company in the same investor’s portfolio. The investors could have saved a few millions, or even the whole venture, simply by listening to the concerns.

Hey, I’ve been wrong sometimes too (my recent RRSP investments in cleantech prove I can’t predict the future!), but the point is: raising relevant questions shouldn’t be punished, it should be rewarded. See financial crisis.

Wasted lives

There is a direct connection between wasted money and wasted lives. Between poor policies, indecent executive compensation, and poverty.  I have a picture I can’t take out of my head: when I was living in Manila, I saw a woman sleeping on a bridge, a baby in her arms, above the busiest highway in the city. I could contrast that with the opulence of the diplomats I worked with (for the record, I was making just a little over $1,300 per month as a trainee.)

Anyone getting a salary they don’t deserve is responsible for supporting the wrong system, a system that put that woman and her baby on that bridge. They will look the other way, make donations to feel better and find excuses for themselves, on how $470K per year is justified given this and that, how others make more, how the system requires them to make that much – but the only valid question is: all things considered, am I destroying value and human lives by taking more than my fair share?

In the case of MaRS, is the CEO’s obscene salary forcing some entrepreneurs to take a full-time job while starting their company? I know a number of such entrepreneurs in Toronto. Two of them just had babies. So cut MaRS CEO’s salary and give them the money instead – I assure you they will create more value.

Now, I am not suggesting we cap salaries or downsize all well-paying jobs. I am suggesting that there should be clear performance management and accountability, especially for large public-sector rewards whose value to the public constituency they are supposed to serve can be fuzzy.

And if we ever want to live in a true meritocracy, raising questions and protecting the whistleblowers is a must, not an option.

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Canadian entrepreneurs canada, commercialization, entrepreneurship, executive compensation, mars discovery district, Ontario, public policy, toronto

Two days ago I wrote about the incredible $470K salary of the MaRS Discovery District CEO and UofT president spouse, the $130M in subsidies the institution pocketed between 2002 and 2008, and the deficit in public reporting. Today I take a look into the results of all that spending.

Why spoil a good party with performance management?

The poor public reporting I talked about in my last post is only one of several issues with MaRS, which fuel palpable resentment against the institution among many in Toronto’s growing entrepreneurial community. Another problem area that entrepreneurs often point to is the low ROI of the hub. While we are aware of the costs, little is known about the hub’s actual results.

For an institution that promotes science, performance measurement appears surprisingly unscientific. Externally, all we hear are sound bytes such as “Kalgene (a division of Kalgene Pharmaceuticals – a MaRS client company and incubator tenant) raises $500,000”. And quite often, as in Kalgene’s case, this fundraising is achieved through a province-sponsored investment fund. Talk about healthy due diligence.

Scientific measurement of the hub’s performance would require assessing actual “performance improvement”. Not fundraising events that may have happened anyway without the institution’s help, and not the inputs into those results (“we helped x companies” and “had x appointments”) as was put forward by the hub’s communication officer when I asked the question last year [April 10 update: and the only indicators on the "Where does my money go" page at the time of this post]. It would also cover more than just select MaRS clients, to assess the effectiveness of the help provided across all startups in Toronto, since that’s the mandate that comes with $130M in public subsidies. Handing money out selectively might help the recipient but it leaves many in the cold, harms local competitors of that recipient, and overall distorts the marketplace.

(As a sidenote, MaRS channels entrepreneurs in different categories, each with a different volume of support. The winner-picking approach means that the hub ends up throwing a lot more support behind ventures that are quite far along the commercialization curve, rather than actual start-ups.)

Of course, MaRS holds internal performance reviews, but in the absence of public scrutiny, there are few reasons to be critical and many to just keep cashing the checks and claim victory.

System deficiencies and a sample of poor results hint to a low ROI

So, how effective are the advisors at helping companies? Is their advice really worth the salary they are paid? Is it cheaper to provide through MaRS than through the private sector? In the current system, how many clients would MaRS advisors secure without the grants that compel a company to sign up?

Believe it or not, I used to work for a government as a commercialization consultant. The French ministry of Economy and Finance, of all things. As surprising as it may sound for a French initiative, we charged companies for most of our services, even though our rates were subsidized. Now, although I was doing this as a diplomat in the Philippines and then in Pakistan, where few French-speaking consultants could be found, I can tell you that a majority of our “clients” only signed up because we also offered grants and had some administrative power (e.g. we could facilitate visas for their clients and suppliers), and they wanted to keep us happy.

The bottom line is, under such conditions: 1. one generally couldn’t expect great results, because there was no link between an advisor’s pay and the services we provided (I certainly felt more effective as part of the Boston Consulting Group in Toronto) 2. the attribution of grants plus the power coming from being part of the public system made sure clients would invariably provide great feedback. See anything wrong with that? I did, and it further motivated me to emigrate to Canada…  (the Canadian emigration officer in Islamabad had a hard time believing my motives, he told me he had never seen a French diplomat apply before!)

MaRS doesn’t even charge for its commercialization services – unless it has to do with renting space (more on that in the next post). Result-wise, companies generally get what they pay for. “Clients” know that and those I interacted with care little for the free support. What they want is what we all do: cash. So they go along with this circus, and pay lip service to the institution. Some good advisors open doors and get stuff done for their clients, but they seemed the exception rather than the rule – the system just does not reward that behavior much. More often than not in my observation, entrepreneurs just had an opinionated public servant to deal with, who might sit on their board and even sometimes collect equity for its public sponsors (that last fact was mentioned to me by an insider although I did not doublecheck it.)

In the course of my activity and my discussions, that was a recurring theme – even before I started seeing the issues with the hub for myself. Several entrepreneurs, who won’t go public not to threaten their MaRS-administered grants (and there are many), mentioned in private that to get grants they felt they were obligated to work with the advisors, even though those helped very little. One told me that “MaRS people think high of themselves but results don’t second that. In hindsight, we would have been better off without their help.”

Granted, my assessment is not highly scientific either – my sample would not be considered large enough to constitute a true survey. But since MaRS regards soundbytes as valid performance measurement, I am certain they will consider the ones I collected seriously.

Opacity in grant attribution decisions, and back scratching

MaRS relies on close-knit self-serving networks to attribute projects. One could even say caucasian networks… Check out the list of advisors – out of 26, not one is part of visible minority (at the time of this post) – that can’t possibly be an accident in a city where 47 percent of the population reported themselves as being part of a visible minority. I know this is not the only organization in the city where most executives are white, but as a subsidized nonprofit, I would expect better – and it supports my experience, which is that grants and projects are attributed not based on performance, but on loyalty, reciprocity and generally being part of the club.

For most grants, such as BMEP or a subsidized “Outsourced Executive”, you can’t apply directly. You have to be “retained” based on undisclosed criteria. The process puts a lot of discretionary power in the hands of advisors. Are they better at picking winners than, say, venture capitalists who do that for a living and even then have to spread their bets widely? Short of replacing grants with tax incentives, which would be fairer and level the playing field, the selection process of a publicly-funded service should be much more transparent and open.

I was the consulting recipient of two MaRS grants last year, thanks to relationships with advisors. One of the clients renewed my contract twice, and the other secured multiple more leads than initially expected as the outcome of our work. I received recommendation letters for both, one by a MaRS advisor. After understanding the system better, I raised my concerns about the institution’s opacity through some discussions with advisors and others. As I imagined it might happen, in spite of the acknowledged results, I have not been referred any project from MaRS since.

Note that in my conversations last year, I was told, both by MaRS insiders and others who shared similar concerns and had experience with the institution, that if I publicly raised my concern, I should expect to be sidelined. That it is a “highly politicized minefield”, with lots of interests at play, and “yes, this is opaque and not ideally ran, but you can’t change city hall”.

No way. I came all the way to this country because that’s where anyone can express themselves and change things if they have a case. Canada is no banana republic, and so here is my attempt at changing city hall. And those who agree should stop fearing for their own self and stand up before another $130 million get wasted. Revolution! ;)

My post next monday tuesday will be about the MaRS-led institutionalization of viable private-sector services and real estate expansion of innovation hubs in Ontario.

Canadian entrepreneurs innovation hubs, innovation policy, mars discovery district, Ontario, Ontario government, Ontario Ministry of Research and Innovation, toronto

A great post today by Suzanne Dingwall Williams of Venture Law Associates LLP in Toronto, regarding the recent considerations by the U.S. to increase the number of H1B visas for skilled foreign workers, apparently thanks to a push by venture capitalists.

The stats she quotes are startling: 

“A recently released study by the NVCA notes that (a) immigrants have started more than 25% of U.S. public companies that were formerly venture backed, and (b) more than 50% of the employment generated by U.S. public venture-backed companies has come from immigrant-founded companies like Intel, eBay, Yahoo!, and Sun.

The New York Times has also taken note, citing Harvard Law professor Vivek Wadhwa’s claim that 52.4% of today’s Silicon Valley startups have at least one foreign founder. US VCs are figuring that, to expand domestic deal flow, they need to expand the immigrant entrepreneur base.”

Having lived in six countries including the U.S., I can tell for a fact that the amount of energy I deployed to learn about and obtain the visas and other administrative passes giving me the right to stay and to work is stupendous. In volume, it easily equals the time required to launch the operations of a start-up. This truly is wasted time. If the U.S. had made it easier for me to stay after my years at Stanford, I’d likely be there. I truly love Canada and Toronto is my favorite city in the world – but on a professional level, for tech entrepreneurs the environment is just not comparable to California. So the main advantage of Canada over the U.S., as Suzie points out, is that it is easier to immigrate as a skilled worker here.

But if that advantage diminishes, what’s left to retain immigrant tech entrepreneurs in Canada?

Better public support for start-ups? More grants? Sure, that’s one thing we have over the U.S. But it’s also a double-edged sword: in the previous years and months, the government and semi-public/nonprofit bodies have rapidly enriched their offering to better support the local tissue of tech entrepreneurs. That part is great. But a problem that’s not often raised -no one wants to publicly irk the hands that feed them, I guess- is the increasing institutionalization of venture commercialization actitivities that came with it: internal competition between agencies and “nonprofits” (whose employees clearly profited from this boom) are now leading some of them to expand into the private sector’s realm, for example by offering free market research and consulting services for start-ups. That move even goes against the public service mandate, as those services are generally only available to handpicked “clients”.

Even though it is motivated by a will to better support start-ups, it troubles me that the government and the bodies it supports increasingly choose to nationalize this activity as opposed to supporting the private providers already present. I didn’t leave the most successful communist country in the world – I’m talking of France – to land back in a growingly soviet-like environment, and have to make a living by begging for public grants! Hubs and catalysts are much needed. But it is to complement and promote, not replace, our private entrepreneurial ecosystem.

Sure, there is a lot of good work done hand-in-hand by private, public and publicly subsidized nonprofit organizations here, but when it comes to actual commercialization projects, it’s been my experience again and again that someone with a guaranteed salary and an institutional job simply doesn’t deliver as much value as a private sector provider whose next job depends on the quality of the one at hand. But unfortunately for us, it’s hard to compete with free. ”Free” also creates the wrong culture up north, with start-ups getting used to focusing on the technology and not investing much in commercialization and marketing, which obviously comes back to bite them. The higher valuation Americans place on commercialization activities, in my opinion, is another characteristic of the U.S. entrepreneurial ecosystem that still makes it more compelling than the Canadian one. With higher quotas for H1B visas, it won’t just attract better entrepreneurs , it will also attract better professionals to support those entrepreneurs.

As for VCs in Canada, there are few left, and so companies here are forced to look south or reduce their fundraising expectations and go after angels (who have done a tremendous job filling the gap left by VCs in early stages, but simply don’t have the same financial firepower). Interestingly, the VCs that are left also tend to only provide small amounts and thus really start looking more like angels with extra overheads. Among the Canadian clients I helped this year, and other start-ups I know here that received term sheets from Canadian VCs, not one accepted them. They went for local angels or U.S. VCs. Canadian VCs are stuck in the middle.

Luckily for Canada, U.S. H1Bs are not as compelling as the permanent residence our country is handing over to skilled workers, since they are tied to employment – it’s E visas and green cards the U.S. should make easier for entrepreneurs to obtain (and perhaps they are working on that too, I haven’t checked). But if the great Canadian advantage in facilitating entry and residence of skilled workers goes away, there will be little left here for immigrant entrepreneurs. A Canadian spouse and public healthcare (also something the U.S. may address) as the main reasons for most of them to stay here doesn’t make for great headlines about the state of our entrepreneurial system.

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Canadian entrepreneurs canada, Entrepreneur, h1b, immigration, permanent resident, Silicon Valley, skilled workers, Start Up, tech venture, toronto, US, venture capital, visa

Great entry by Jon Worren on Why the chasm still exists, on the blog of Toronto’s innovation hub MaRS. Nicely complements the last post on this blog.

Develop chasm, hub, innovation, mars discovery district, toronto